What is nearshoring, and why it doesn't reduce supplier concentration risk

Nearshoring moved a lot of production closer to the end market over the last several years. Moving a supplier from Shenzhen to Monterrey, or from Vietnam to Poland, shortens the shipping lane and the lead time. It does nothing about where that supplier physically sits relative to every other supplier you now also have making the same part.
That's the gap category managers keep running into. Leadership asks for a nearshoring plan to cut the China exposure. The team executes it. Six months later a flood in one river valley, or a labor dispute at one industrial park, takes out four of the "diversified" suppliers at once, because they were never diversified in the first place. They were all within a two-hour drive of each other, because that's where the skilled labor, the ports, and the tier-one suppliers already were.
Nearshoring moves the risk without spreading it out
Nearshoring solves a logistics and trade-policy problem. It shortens the lane, cuts tariff exposure, and gets lead times down to something a planner can actually commit to. Those are real wins, and category managers are right to chase them.
What it doesn't solve is the question that comes right after: once you've nearshored, did your suppliers all land in the same place anyway? Supply bases that move to Mexico cluster around Nuevo León and Baja California, because that's where the automotive and electronics ecosystem already exists. Supply bases that move to Eastern Europe cluster along a handful of logistics corridors for the same reason. Nearshoring works by routing production into an existing supplier ecosystem, and those ecosystems are, almost by definition, concentrated in a small number of places. A country-level concentration risk turns into a tighter, regional one, often without anyone on the sourcing side noticing, because the vendor list now shows ten company names across four cities, and ten names in four cities reads as diversification on a spreadsheet.
Regional supplier clustering is the part nobody checks
This is the piece a typical reshoring supply chain risk review skips. The review checks country exposure, sometimes tier-one versus tier-two exposure, occasionally single-source part numbers. It rarely checks whether a dozen approved vendors across three tiers are all drawing labor, power, or logistics from the same industrial park, the same flood plain, or the same port catchment. A vendor-address spreadsheet doesn't surface that on its own. Someone would have to plot every supplier on an actual map and read the clusters by eye, which is the manual cross-reference most procurement teams don't have the hours to run, let alone run again every year as the supply base turns over.
Friendshoring has the same blind spot
Friendshoring gets pitched as the more sophisticated cousin of nearshoring: keep production inside a bloc of allied countries rather than just a neighboring one. It still answers a geopolitical question, not a geographic one. A friendshoring strategy that shifts volume from China to "allied Asia" can concentrate half a category in one Vietnamese or Malaysian province for the same ecosystem-gravity reason nearshoring concentrates around Monterrey. The label on the strategy changes. The exposure to one bad storm season or one port closure doesn't.
Nearshoring and friendshoring aren't bad calls. They fix the problems they're built to fix. They leave the geography question open, and that question is physical, because it gets answered by looking at where the buildings are, not at which flag is on the invoice.
That's worth checking once a year on top of whatever sourcing strategy is already signed off: take the current vendor list, however diversified it looks on the org chart, and see what a concentration map built from the actual supplier footprint turns up. If a nearshoring push landed eight suppliers inside the same industrial park, better to know that before storm season than after it.